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Sammendrag:. Det Nederlandske marked for 
fornybar energi har gjennomgått dyptgripende 
endringer i de seneste tiår.  
Nederlandske myndigheter har intervenert ofte, med 
betydelige skift i både politikk og fremgangsmåte. 
Målet med denne studien er å analysere utviklingen i 
politikken overfor fornybar energi. Studien vurderer 
endringer i virkemiddelbruk og målgrupper, og ser 
også på ulike gruppers innflytelse og på hva som kan 
forklare success og fiasko.  
 
Studien trekker følgende konklusjoner om politikken. 
For det første har målene ofte vært uklare: Selv om 
myndighetene har vektlagt investering i lokal 
kraftproduksjon, har politikken (implisitt) latt import 
være en mulighet for å oppfylle målsetningene. For det 
andre fokuserte man lenge på å få ned administrative 
barrierer og investeringskostnader - det er nå i det siste 
man har sett at et ustabilt investeringsklima kan 
representere en hindring. Det at økonomi-ministeriet 
har spilt en dominerende rolle i politikk-utformingen 
for fornybar energi kan ha medvirket til at man ikke 
har forutsett en negativ markedsreaksjon på enkelte 
initiativer. 
   
Abstract: Over the last decades, fundamental changes 
in both market conditions and the national and 
international policy framework in the Netherlands can 
be observed. The Dutch Government has intervened in 
markets regularly, demonstrating fundamental shifts in 
policy and approach. This study aims to analyse the 
developments in renewable energy policy making in 
the Netherlands. It assesses changes in the choice of 
policy instruments and target groups, the role of 
stakeholders and offers explanations behind policy 
successes and failures. The following conclusions can 
be drawn on the policy choices: First, the objectives 
and targets of Dutch renewable energy policy were 
frequently ambiguous. Although the government 
emphasised the importance of investments in local 
capacity, imports were always (implicitly) seen as an 
alternative option in meeting targets. Second, for a 
long period the government focused on reducing 
investment costs and dismantling administrative 
barriers. Only recently has the lack of a stable 
investment climate been identified as a potential 
barrier. Third, although many stakeholders have 
advocated a mandatory approach, Dutch policies 
stimulating renewable energy have always been 
voluntary. Finally, the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
has always played a very dominant role in renewable 
energy policy formulation and implementation, which 
may explain the fact that some unfavourable market 
reactions to policies have not been foreseen. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and problem definition 
The renewable energy market in the Netherlands started its development in the early 1970s. 
Over the last decades we have observed changes in both market conditions as well as in the 
national and international policy framework.  The Dutch Government has intervened 
regularly in markets, demonstrating fundamental shifts in policy and approach; domestic 
policies have diverged significantly from those of other European Union (EU) countries. 
Policy success, however, has been limited, and some have even failed. This study attempts to 
find explanations for these developments and examines the lessons that can be learned. 
1.2 Methodological framework 
This study aims to analyse the developments in renewable energy policy making in the 
Netherlands. It assesses changes in the choice of policy instruments and target groups, the 
(changing) role of stakeholders and offers explanations behind policy successes and failures. 
The following methodological approach is used to analyse developments in renewable 
energy policy making in the Netherlands: 
1. The development of domestic green electricity markets and the international policy 
framework are described 
2. Fundamental changes in Dutch policy over recent decades are identified  
3. The effectiveness of policy is assessed in terms of its contribution to policy goals 
4. Policy decisions are analysed using the policy arrangement concept 
5. Recommendations are given for improvements to the policy-making process 
 
Policy arrangement 
The policy arrangement concept is a theoretical notion that can help us to analyse policy 
change in the field of green electricity. The concept is described in “Political Modernisation 
and Policy Arrangements: A Framework for Modernisation in Environmental Policy,” by 
Leroy et al. (2001). It refers to the way in which a policy field (in this case renewable energy) 
is organised in terms of content (policy discourse and programmes) and organisation (actors, 
coalitions, power, influence and rules) (KUN, 2001). The dimensions of the policy 
arrangement have also been described as follows by Van der Zouwen and Van den Top 
(2000). In the next sections, these dimensions are discussed.  
1. Actors, coalitions, power and influence 
Actors are organisations or institutions that operate in a specific policy domain, such as for 
the promotion of green electricity. The term 'coalition' is used to indicate the interaction 
between actors. A coalition is a group of actors that more or less share the same policy goals 
and programmes, and these common objectives form the basis for their involvement in the 
policy process. The power and influence controlled by actors is determined by their relation 
particularly the mutual dependency and the distribution of resources among the actors. 
Resources can take the form of financial means, knowledge, media access, etc., and their 
distribution indicates the relative influence of actors at various stages in the policy process.  
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2. Rules 
Rules provide a framework for policies and politics and determine which norms are 
legitimate. A distinction is often made between formal and informal rules. Formal rules are 
rules actors have formally agreed upon, while informal rules reflect the dominant political 
culture. 
3. Policy discourse 
To give meaning to and to help resolve policy issues, actors use so-called policy discourses. A 
policy discourse is defined as, "a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorisations 
that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and through 
which meaning is given to physical and social realities". More concrete, a policy discourse 
encompasses the content of policy, in terms of norms, values, and the specific content of 
policy papers and measures. 
We will analyse the changes in policies in the Netherlands over the last decades in terms of 
these three dimensions.  We will argue that the history of green electricity policy in the 
Netherlands shows several fundamental changes in actors, their influence, the policy 
discourse and the prevailing rules. The resulting analytical model is as follows: 
1. Relevant actors and their influence are charted, including their development over 
time.  
2. Within the arrangement of actors, rules are reconstructed. This involves providing 
answers to the following questions: Who has determined the agenda? Who has been 
involved in policy making and has given advice? Who has made the decisions? 
3. Finally, and most importantly, the policy discourse is analysed by addressing the 
following: What have been the leading concepts and practices? What have been the 
starting points and assumptions? How have the actors interpreted these concepts? 
 
The three dimensions of green electricity policy can, subsequently, also serve as an analytical 
framework, an intervention model for identifying possible improvements to policies. 
2 Green electricity policy and markets in the Netherlands: a 
brief history 
2.1 Long-standing experience, but limited market share 
The Netherlands has gained considerable experience in the promotion of the green energy 
market. Directly after the first oil crisis, the government started promoting research and 
development (R&D). In this period, industrial activities generating wind and solar energy 
were set up. These activities were often driven by personal idealistic initiatives, which are not 
based on long-term company strategy . During the 1980s, policy shifted to providing (direct 
investor) subsidies and financing demonstration projects. The intention was to speed up 
market growth, leading to a reduction of costs, which would in turn promote further market 
expansion. In the early 1990s, international agreements on CO2 stabilisation gave policy a 
new momentum. Over the last decades, a variety of policy instruments, including direct 
investment subsidies, fiscal facilities, voluntary agreements, consumer subsidies and R&D 
programmes, have been implemented. The relative share of renewable energy is, however, 
still limited. For years the share has amounted to around 1% (ECN, 2002). 
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Table 1: Share of renewable energy produced in the Netherlands 
Year Peta Joule  
(primary energy) 
% Energy 
consumption 
% Electricity 
consumption 
1990 17 0.6% 0.9% 
1995 21 0.7% 1.3% 
2000 38 1.2% 2.5% 
2001 42 1.3% 2.8% 
Source: Novem, 2002 
 
2.2 Three phases in policy development since 1990  
Dutch green electricity policy over the last decade has been characterised by three phases (see 
Figure 1). 
Phase 3: 
promotion of 
production
197
3
199
6
199
0 200
3
Phase 1: 
voluntary 
targets
Phase 2: 
promotion of 
demand
ecotax liberalisation of 
green consumers 
market
History: 
(investor) 
subsidies & 
R&D
Figure 1: Phases in Dutch green electricity policy 
 
Phase 1: Voluntary targets 
In the early 1990s, the government negotiated voluntary agreements with the energy 
distribution sector. The latter committed itself to voluntary sales targets for renewables 
amounting to 3.2% of electricity sales and 0.7% of gas sales by the year 2000. These 
measures were expected to lead to a 2.7Mt reduction in CO2 emissions over the same period. 
Investments in green energy were financed by a general environmental levy. The privatisation 
of the electricity sector, however, forced changes in the fiscal system as it was feared that 
reallocation of tax revenues to cover the cost of green energy would disturb the market. The 
voluntary targets were never realised. 
Phase 2: The first change in discourse: promotion of demand 
Regulatory energy tax 
In 1996, the government introduced a regulatory energy tax – also known as the “ecotax” – 
for small and medium scale energy users. This new tax system was also used to stimulate 
green electricity consumption (and partly production). Consumers of green electricity were 
exempted from the energy tax. In addition, production support was given to green suppliers. 
A breakdown of the fiscal support is presented in the table below. In 2002, total support to 
green electricity amounted to eight Euro Cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh) (comprised of six 
Euro Cents for consumer support and two Euro Cents for production support). In terms of 
avoided tons of CO2, support for renewables amounted to a maximum of €150 per ton of CO2 
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if one would relate the financial support for renewables to the avoided GHG emission in the 
central electricity production (Ministry of Spatial Planning and Environment, 1999). 
Table 2: Fiscal support green electricity 1996-2002 (€/kWh) 
kWh) 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Article 36i 
(consumptio
n) 
       
0-800 0 0 0 0 0 0.0583 0.0601 
800-10,000 0.0134 0.0134 0.0134 0.0225 0.0372 0.0583 0.0601 
10-50,000 0.0134 0.0134 0.0134 0.0147 0.0161 0.0194 0.0200 
50,000-10m 0 0 0 0.0010 0.0022 0.0059 0.0061 
> 10m 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Article 36o 
(production) 
0.0134 0.0134 0.0134 0.0147 0.0161 0.0194 0.0200 
Source: P. Kroon, 2002 
 
Liberalisation of the green consumer market 
The next important phase of Dutch green electricity policy was the liberalisation of the green 
consumer market in July 2001. At the same time, the government transformed the informal, 
voluntary green label system, implemented by the energy sector in 1998, into a formal green 
certificates system managed by the government. 
Since 1996, the number of green consumers has increased from 16,000 to 1.4 million 
(Kroon, 2002; van Sambeek, 2003). This sharp increase in demand is the result of the 
financial support measures (for consumers, the price difference between green and 
conventional grey electricity was in effect zero), combined with market liberalisation. 
Anticipating future full liberalisation, electricity companies have used green electricity as a 
market tool to attract new customers and keep existing ones. 
Table 3: Total demand green electricity (GWh) 
 Households Non-residential Total 
1996 49  60 
1997 131 21 95 
1998 239 45 172 
1999 250 82 350 
2000 439 128 600 
2001 750 250 1000 
1/2002 2100  2100 
4/2002 2400  2400 
7/2002 3000  3000 
Source: P. Kroon, 2002. The data on non-residential green electricity consumption are uncertain. The 
overall demand in the years 1996, and 2002 are estimated using data on the energy tax revenues. The 
main conclusion, however, can be drawn that the drastic increase in demand in 2001/2002 mainly 
occurred in the residential sector. 
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The steep increase in demand for renewable electricity could not, however, be met by national 
production alone. As the subsidy also applied to electricity generated abroad, imports of green 
electricity increased rapidly. The policy, therefore, resulted in the unintentional mass 'export' 
of national support to renewable energy. Criticism increased rapidly, because the majority of 
the Dutch taxpayers’ money was spent on green electricity generated in other countries. The 
policy did not even result in substantial new capacity abroad. 
Table 4: Production and import green electricity (GWhe) 
Year Import Production 
1991 N/A 857.49 
1992 N/A 922.84 
1993 N/A 932.99 
1994 N/A 1 054.57 
1995 N/A 1 142.11 
1996 N/A 1 569.30 
1997 N/A 1 699.39 
1998 N/A 1 981.90 
1999 N/A 2 116.26 
2000 1 500 2 579.75 
2001 7 645  2 937.361 
2002 10 350 3 626.70 
Source: CBS 
 
Table 5: Dutch production of green electricity by source (GWh) 
 1999 2000 
Hydro 90 142 
Wind 645 829 
Solar (PV) 5.3 7.7 
Bio-energy 
(incineration) 
(landfills) 
1372 
(909) 
(132) 
1585 
(923) 
(117) 
Total 2112 2564 
Source: P. Kroon, 2002 
 
Between 1995 and 2002, Dutch green electricity policy instruments focused on the 
stimulation of demand by means of price incentives, while all other EU countries introduced 
other incentive schemes (see Figure 2). Following growing criticism, the Dutch government 
proposed a new policy with fundamental differences, at the end of 2002. 
                                                     
1 Equivalent to 2.8% of electricity consumption (see Table 1). 
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Supply 
Feed-in tariff/green prices 
(Germany, Austria, Spain, France, 
Greece, Portugal, Finland 
Tender 
(Ireland) 
 
Obligation for producers 
(Italy) 
Demand Price support for demand 
(Netherlands) 
 
Obligation (%) for consumers or 
suppliers 
(Denmark, UK, Belgium, Austria (small 
hydro), Sweden) 
 Price Quantity 
Figure 2: EU member incentive schemes 2002 
Source: ECN, 2002 
 
Phase 3: A new discourse: promoting production  
A new policy, called the “environmental quality of electricity production” (MEP), was 
implemented in July 2003. The two main objectives of the MEP are to reduce investment risk 
and to improve the cost-effectiveness of renewable electricity. Support is provided by means 
of a feed-in tariff, combined with a partial exemption from the ecotax (see Table 6 below). 
The tariff is financed through a €34 annual levy on the electricity connections of every 
household (van Sambeek et al., 2003). 
The ecotax exemption will be phased out over two years. By July 2004, it will amount to 
1.5 Euro Cents per kWh, falling to zero in 2005. By this time, the stimulation of the Dutch 
green electricity market will be fully supply driven. The removal of the leakage abroad is 
expected to lead to a benefit of €120m to the Treasury (Stromen, 2003). 
Table 6: Support for renewable electricity (Euro Cents/kWh) 
Technology-energy source MEP feed-in 
tariff 
Ecotax 
exemption 
Total support 
Landfill gas and digestion 0 2.9 2.9 
Pure biomass 4.8 2.9 7.7 
Mixed streams 2.9 0 2.9 
Onshore wind 4.9 2.9 7.8 
Offshore wind 6.8 2.9 9.7 
Stand-alone bio-energy 
installations < 50MWe 
6.8 2.9 9.7 
Solar photovoltaic 6.8 2.9 9.7 
Wave energy, tidal energy 6.8 2.9 9.7 
Hydropower 6.8 0 6.8 
Source: van Sambeek et al., 2003 
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2.3 Summary 
The table below summarises the main developments in renewable energy policy in the 
Netherlands over the last 30 years. Substantial changes have occurred in the economic and 
market conditions for renewable energy during this period. Also, the international policy 
framework has significantly changed, while the Dutch Government has given renewable 
energy an increasingly higher priority. At the same time, however, several significant changes 
can be witnessed in the approach used to promote renewable energy, reflected in the choice of 
policy instruments and main target groups. 
Table 7: Policy characteristics 
 
1970-1989 
 
 
1990-1995 
 
 
1996-2002 
 
2003-ongoing 
History Phase 1: 
voluntary 
agreements 
Phase 2: promotion 
of demand 
Phase 3: 
promotion of 
supply 
Immature policy 
 
Driven by scarcity 
of resources 
 
Dominated by 
(investor) 
subsidies and 
R&D 
Further 
professionalisation 
 
New driver: CO2 
emissions 
 
Voluntary 
agreements 
introduced 
 
Targets not met 
Introduction of tax 
exemption for 
renewable electricity 
consumption 
 
Steep increase in 
demand for green 
electricity  
 
Increased budgets 
 
Huge outflow of 
resources 
Professional policy 
environment 
 
New policy: 
emphasis on 
stimulation of 
production instead 
of consumption 
 
Increased 
compatibility with 
other EU MS 
schemes 
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3 Actors, their influence and the rules of policy making 
3.1 Overview of actors 
Many different actors have played a role in the development of green electricity policies in 
the Netherlands. Figure 3 provides an overview of the relative influence of the different actors 
in policy decision-making during the last decades. 
Ministry of 
Economic Affairs
Ministry of 
Finance
Ministry of 
Environment
Energy 
sector
Consumers
Parliament
Environmental 
NGO’s
EU
Green industry and 
project developers
Grey industry 
(steel, chemicals, 
etc)
Strong influence / strong lobby
Limited influence / weak lobby
 
Figure 3: Actors and their influence 
The Ministry of Economic Affairs has been the dominant player in policy development. It has 
formal authority for energy policy development and is responsible for a large part of the 
budget for policy implementation. At the beginning of the 1990s, the picture was somewhat 
simpler than the situation presented above. The Ministry of Economic Affairs dominated the 
scene along with the energy sector. Other stakeholders played a minor role. Since the mid-
1990s, the role of other stakeholders, such as the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of 
Finance, has gained some importance. The latter was involved in the implementation of fiscal 
instruments and performed a control function in the green certificates system. In addition, 
green and grey industrial parties influenced the policy process through lobbying. The grey 
industry and the energy sector have always successfully opposed the introduction of taxes on 
energy or the introduction of a compulsory share of renewable electricity. The role of 
environmental NGOs and consumers in policy making has been relatively limited. 
3.2 The rules of policy making 
As indicated in Section 1, the rules of the policy-making process can be classified as formal 
or informal. The first category refers to formally agreed regulations, mostly laid down in 
policy documents and laws. Informal rules are “rules of the game” reflecting norms, values 
and cultural habits. Rules provide a framework for policies and politics and determine which 
norms are legitimate. The main questions we seek to answer are: Who determines the agenda? 
Who is involved in policy making? Who decides? 
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Formal rules of policy making are few in the Netherlands. The Ministry of Economic 
Affairs has formal responsibility for this policy field. Obviously, the Ministry of Finance has 
a formal role in the establishing and approving the budgets. No fixed procedures for 
consulting stakeholders exist. 
Regarding informal rules, the Ministry of Economic Affairs has predominately shaped the 
process of renewable energy policy making as well as its key content. Both the Minister as 
well as the responsible departments have played a dominant role. Other ministries have not 
played a significant role in policy preparation and implementation. On more than occasion, 
the Ministry has readily overruled initiatives from other departments. 
Despite the apparent openness of the Dutch policy-making process in general, the 
participation of stakeholders and their influence on renewable energy policy has been limited. 
Most of the new policies have been prepared within the Ministry itself with limited external 
cooperation. Over the years, the dominant position of the Ministry has even increased; for 
example, the fact that the latest major shift in policy was fully prepared within the Ministry 
(2002) is a case in point. Only at a very late stage were other stakeholders consulted and 
asked to comment on almost finalised drafts. 
The European Union’s role in determining policy making in the Netherlands has been 
preliminarily in competition issues and in relation with the EU Directive on Renewable 
Electricity. 
4 Policy discourse and practices  
4.1 Phase 1: Voluntary agreements (1990-1995) 
As mentioned above, the voluntary agreements of 1990 were made between the government 
and the energy sector. This conformed to the Dutch culture of “gentlemen's agreements”. 
Although this arrangement was still in place in 1995, the policy environment soon fell under 
the influence of new developments. The Ministry of Economic Affairs published a leading 
policy document in December 1995, containing the first officially approved renewable energy 
target. The document - the government’s Third White Paper on Energy - stated that 10% of 
energy consumption, amounting to 17% of total electricity output, should come from 
renewable sources by 2020 (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1995). The table below presents a 
breakdown of this target by energy source. 
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Table 8: Breakdown of renewable energy targets 
Energy source Contribution in 2020 (PJ of primary energy) 
Wind energy 45 
Photovoltaic solar energy 10 
Thermal solar energy 10 
Geothermal energy 2 
Thermal energy storage in aquifers 15 
Ambient heat 65 
Hydropower 3 
Energy from biomass and waste 120 
Total 270 
Imported Norwegian hydropower 18 
Total 288 
 
The Third White Paper on Energy, together with further liberalisation of the energy market, 
signified a new phase in Dutch renewable energy policy. The period of voluntary agreements 
had, however, been important; it was the first time that the government had intervened in the 
market by setting targets. At the same time, targets had not been compulsory; the compliance 
regime was poor, and targets were never met. Furthermore, neither Parliament nor NGOs 
raised questions about the evident failure of policy objectives. 
4.2 Phase 2: Promotion of demand (1996-2002) 
Since the mid-1990s, renewable energy policy has matured. Various policy documents have 
been released and more stakeholders have become involved in the policy-making process.  
Alongside the introduction of the ecotax exemption in 1996, the government has actively 
promoted demand for renewable electricity. For years, however, there has been discussion 
over whether the voluntary approach should be replaced by a consumer obligation to buy 
green energy. The Ministry of Economic Affairs has been consistently reluctant towards 
introducing obligatory measures, while other stakeholders have advocated this policy option. 
Since 1995 different key policy documents on renewable energy policy were published, 
starting with the White Paper in 1995. Table 9 gives an overview of the main publications. 
These documents and the related policies are discussed below. 
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Table 9: Key (advisory) policy documents 
Year Publication Key characteristics 
1995 Third White Paper Target: 10% renewables by 2020 
March 1997 Renewable Energy 
Action Programme 
1997-2000 
Implementation of Third White Paper 
March 1999 Renewable Energy 
Policy Advice by AER 
(Energy Council) 
Current policy not sufficient to meet 10% target; 
adjustments needed: more stringent, less complex, more 
generic; consumer obligation should be considered 
June 1999 Climate Policy 
Implementation Plan  
Target: 5% renewable by 2010 
Discussion on obligation 
November 1999 First Energy Report  Warning: slow growth of the market 
Current policies intensified, focus on supply conditions 
No obligation 
June 2002 Second Energy 
Report 
Warning: supply lags behind 
 
The Third White Paper 
The Third White Paper addressed the conflict between the liberalisation of the electricity 
market on the one hand, and compulsory renewable energy targets on the other. It claimed 
that attaining a minimum compulsory share of renewable electricity consumption would no 
longer be feasible under free-market conditions. Liberalisation had restructured the energy 
market, and therefore required a shift in focus from supply-side instruments (i.e. compulsory 
targets) to demand-side measures, particularly in the fiscal regime (i.e. the ecotax). The White 
Paper suggests that if targets are not met, a purchase obligation could be imposed on the 
remaining captive customers. 
Furthermore, since the adoption of the 10% renewable energy target in 1995, a debate has 
emerged over the role of imports to help meet objectives. The discussion has been influenced 
by the results of various studies, which show that the Dutch target was relatively difficult to 
meet and that it would be costly to achieve within the borders of the country exclusively. The 
Dutch government, therefore, has always kept the option of meeting part of the target by 
means of import open. 
The Renewable Energy Action Programme 
The targets of the Third White Paper on Energy were developed further by the Renewable 
Energy Action Programme 1997-2000, which was published in early 1997. Three main policy 
objectives were advocated: (1) the development of technologies via research, development 
and demonstration programmes; (2) the promotion of market penetration though a broad 
range of (fiscal) instruments; and (3) the reduction of administrative bottlenecks by better 
integration of different policies (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1997). The main objective 
was to stimulate investment in renewable energy and its related infrastructure (Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, 1995). 
Renewable Energy Policy Advice by the Energy Council 
In December 1998, the Minister of Economic Affairs sent a request for policy advice to the 
Energy Council (AER). The AER was requested to advise on the mix of policy instruments 
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for renewable energy presented by the Action Programme of 1997. At the beginning of 1999, 
the AER published its advice. It concluded that current policy would not be sufficient to meet 
the 2020 targets, and that policy revisions were needed. According to the AER, this process 
would provide the opportunity for reconsideration of the entire policy mix, which it claimed 
was 'diverse but also complex'. The AER advocated the introduction of generic and simplified 
instruments, and felt that targets would only be obtainable if a legally binding minimum share 
of renewable energy was introduced (AER, 1999). 
The Climate Policy Implementation Plan 
In June 1999, the Ministry of Environment published a policy document on the 
implementation of the Kyoto target on climate change. An intermediate target for renewable 
energy consumption of 5% by the year 2010 was introduced (Ministry of VROM, 1999). 
Policy instruments to meet the 5% objective were not worked out in detail. Essentially, the 
instruments would be voluntary, but provision was made for the introduction of compulsory 
measures if it seemed that the objectives of the climate action plan would not be met. 
According to the document, the new electricity law of 1998 had created the possibility for the 
government to impose a consumer obligation to buy renewables. For details on policy 
instruments and the issue of consumer obligation the Climate Policy Implementation Plan 
referred to the Energy Report, which was due to be published at the close of the year. 
Table 10: Overview of binding renewable energy targets 
Targets 2010 2020 
Energy consumption 5%1 10%2 
Electricity consumption 9% 17%3 
1 Climate Policy Implementation Plan, 1999 
2 Third White Paper on Energy, 1995 
3 Third White Paper on Energy, 1995 (estimation, derived from 10% target energy consumption) 
 
The first Energy Report 
In November 1999, the Ministry of Economic Affairs published its first Energy Report. The 
document discussed the issue of consumer obligation in great detail. According to the 
Ministry, introducing compulsory measures was not the right method to combat the slow 
growth of renewable energy; the main bottleneck was not believed to be demand, but supply. 
The obstructions identified included administrative problems, restrictive environmental 
legislation and high costs. It was decided that existing policy should be intensified. The focal 
areas would continue to be promoting demand by fiscal stimulation, encouraging supply by 
removing administrative barriers and developing a system of green certificates. 
Despite government policy to stimulate growth in renewable energy, expansion of the 
sector was limited. Fiscal support resulted in a steep increase in consumer demand, but the 
relative share of renewables remained small in terms of the total demand for energy. 
Moreover, domestic supply barely increased. Over the years, discussions were held on 
whether demand or supply should be targeted, and whether instruments should be voluntary 
or compulsory. On three occasions in 1999, it was proposed that voluntary policies be 
replaced with obligatory measures in order to improve performance against targets. The first 
was in March, when the Parliament passed a motion in favour of the introduction of a 
renewable energy quota, combined with the introduction of a system of green certificates 
(Motion MP Crone, 1998/1999). In the debate on the Climate Policy Implementation Plan 
obligatory instruments were advocated for a second time. Finally, the Energy Council (AER 
also spoke out in favour of compulsory methods in its advisory publication on renewable 
energy, as detailed above (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1999). 
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The Ministry of Economic Affairs, however, decided not to change its policy. In its first 
Energy Report it argued that an obligation would not be the answer to slow growth in 
renewable energy, and would not bring the target of 5% by 2010 and 10% by 2020 any closer. 
The report concluded that preference should be given to improving the conditions 
determining supply, for example, by resolving administrative problems. In addition, efforts 
would need to be considerably stepped up. 
Obligation or no obligation? 
The introduction of an obligation to buy renewable energy is attractively simple. It would seem to be easy to achieve 
and to offer a guarantee that the targets will be met. This is, however, illusory. 
• A compulsory share of renewable energy is focused on the demand. Research has shown that this is not 
where the main problem lies. The real problem is in the supply: administrative problems (locations) are 
hindering the growth of wind energy; unclear and probably excessively strict environmental legislation on 
biomass emissions and lack of clarity about what should and should not be classified as waste could 
hamper the growth of biomass; high costs are an obstacle to rapid growth of photovoltaic conversion of 
solar energy (solar PV). An obligation will not solve these problems. 
• Higher demand with supply lagging behind will only result in higher prices. 
• In principle, European legal stipulations limit the possibility of providing support (subsidies and preferential 
tax treatment) to renewable energy.  
• While support for eco-power is considerable within the context of the existing voluntary approach, an 
obligation will not enhance motivation. Certainly not if it results in an increase in the cost of eco-power to 
users. 
• Finally, in order to be able to create an obligation, an effectively functioning system of green certificates 
would be necessary. The introduction of green certificates is unique in Europe and in the world. This 
means that we cannot learn from the experience and mistakes of others. It therefore does not make sense 
to link an obligation to such a new system from the outset. 
 
Source: Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1999b 
  
The second Energy Report 
In 2002, the second Energy Report was published. It concluded that development of 
renewable energy in the Netherlands was lagging behind the government target. Although 
demand had grown significantly, growth in supply had been limited. Two reasons behind this 
were said to be problems with spatial planning and the absence of a stable investment climate. 
The report therefore proposed that the policy agenda for the coming years would focus on 
stimulating and developing the domestic supply of renewable energy. Despite this intention, it 
was stated that the Netherlands would probably need to depend in part on imports to meet its 
target for renewable energy. It was, however, questioned whether the country would be able 
to import renewable energy indefinitely, as the European market may also eventually reach 
saturation point. According to the Energy Report, it was therefore necessary to utilise national 
potential as effectively as possible (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2002). 
In 2002, the slow growth of the renewable energy market, together with huge outflows of 
subsidies to non-additional foreign capacity, caused concerns. Although development lagged 
behind national targets, the government decided not to make the purchase of renewable 
energy obligatory (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2002). Again, it stated that market problems 
stemmed from the supply side, but for the first time, a new argument was introduced. 
According to the second Energy Report, the renewable energy market suffered from a lack of 
a stable investment climate. This argument was in line with the findings of Dinica (2002). In 
her Ph.D. thesis on investments in renewable energy, she argued that countries such as Spain 
and the United Kingdom were more successful at stimulating investment because they offered 
investors a more stable policy environment. The renewable energy market in the Netherlands, 
however, was too unstable and fragmented to attract long-term financial support, where risk 
and long-term profitability are less certain. Dinica concluded that as political uncertainty is a 
powerful deterrent to investors, policy change was necessary, and without it, compliance with 
Kyoto commitments was in danger. 
In addition, the second Energy Report argued that the Netherlands would remain dependent 
on renewable energy imports to meet its targets. Although the Report does not propose any 
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changes in policy, it at least draws the attention to this issue and the related market 
uncertainties for the first time.. 
Looking back at the 2nd phase policies: flexible but mostly ineffective 
Looking back, it is interesting to assess whether the policy of the second phase has been 
effective in terms of its objectives. This question is complicated as policy objectives have not 
been clearly defined. Should supply or demand be stimulated? What should the role of 
imports be? This resulted in a strange policy outcome. On the one hand, targets were mainly 
supply-driven (i.e. to stimulate investments in renewable energy), although the door has 
always been kept open to meet the target via imports. On the other hand, instruments were 
mainly used for the promotion of demand. Thus it seems that the government preferred not to 
make explicit choices or to set an ultimatum to make voluntary instruments compulsory in 
case targets were not be met. If, for example, the government had openly agreed that a large 
part of the target could be imported, arrangements could be made to account for double 
counting. This was never done. The approach gave much flexibility. The drawback is, 
however, that as a result, policy was relatively ineffective. After more than six years, 
domestic supply hardly increased, while the steep increase in demand from small-scale 
consumers was mainly met by non-additional capacity from abroad. In addition, in non-
residential sectors, the demand for renewable electricity barely increased. 
Addressing the right barriers 
Between 1996 and 2002, the government identified immature and costly technologies, the 
price gap between green and grey energy, and administrative procedures as the most urgent 
barriers hindering the development of the renewable energy market. 
Various R&D programmes addressed the first barrier, and with the help of fiscal 
instruments and additional subsidies, the price difference for consumers disappeared. 
Furthermore, with much effort and cooperation from, for example, local governments the 
lengthy procedures and other administrative barriers were also reduced over time. Barrier 
removal can therefore be considered a success. As investment in renewable energy hardly 
increased, however, you could question whether the right barriers were actually addressed. 
Did the government overlook barriers? 
At a very late stage (Energy Report 2002), the government mentioned the fact that the slow 
growth in the renewable energy market was caused by an unstable investment climate and 
uncertainty. One could say that over the years the government did not succeed in creating a 
stable investment climate for investors in renewable energy. Policies were diverse and 
complex. Some, such as subsidy conditions, exclusion of technologies from support, and the 
level of support, changed over time. According to Dinica (2002), the Dutch government, 
compared to those of other countries, did not create the right supporting conditions to reduce 
the barriers that hamper the development of renewable electricity generation. He argued that 
economic instruments only support the short-term introduction of renewable technologies. In 
the longer term, however, perceptions of risk and potential profit determine the investment 
decision to a far larger extent (Dinica, 2002). 
Positive impacts and negative effects 
Although the effectiveness of Dutch green electricity policy between 1996 and 2002 has been 
limited, government strategy has produced some positive effects. First of all, consumer 
awareness has increased and renewable energy use has become part of the lifestyle of many 
households. Secondly, the liberalisation of the green electricity market has paved the way for 
the broader liberalisation of the energy market . The energy sector grew accustomed to the 
new market conditions and became used to launching marketing campaigns to attract new 
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customers. Finally, as an environmental front-runner, the Netherlands got much attention 
from abroad. 
At the same time, the government’s approach had several weaknesses. First, only a few 
actors were seriously involved in the policy-making, for example, NGOs made little 
contribution to the process. A broader involvement of stakeholders in the design of policies 
may have prevented some of the unforeseen undesirable impacts of policy, particularly the 
large outflow of financial resources to non-additional capacity abroad. On the other hand, the 
lack of stakeholder involvement made swift changes in policy possible, particularly the recent 
change from demand promotion through tax exemption to supply promotion.  Furthermore, 
criticism about the slow growth of the green energy sector was almost absent. One would 
have expected Parliament to be more concerned with overall policy objectives – such as 
whether or not targets could be reached – and less preoccupied with details, such as 
measurement and monitoring issues, which would only have a small impact. 
4.3 Phase 3: Change of policy: Promotion of supply (2003-ongoing) 
In the development of the latest policy instrument, the MEP, the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs again played a dominant role. The Ministry developed most of the policy itself. Only 
at a late stage were other stakeholders consulted. As in the past, the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs did not choose to introduce a consumer obligation. For similar reasons as given 
previously, a ‘voluntary’ market, stimulated by fiscal support, would remain the basis for the 
renewable energy policy framework. Initially the Ministry preferred a system in which both 
demand and supply could be stimulated. This would be more flexible, which would be 
advantageous if the EU changes its policy, for example. The emphasis, however, changed 
from stimulation of demand to stimulation of supply. In December 2002, MP Crone submitted 
a motion to abolish the stimulation of demand (via an ecotax exemption). He proposed to 
abolish consumer support in favour of higher support of national production. In September 
2003, the Minister of Economic Affairs stated that the partial exemption of the ecotax would 
be abolished by the year 2005. 
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5 Conclusions and lessons learned 
The characteristics and effectiveness of the policy of the three phases is summarised in the table below. 
Table 11: Effectiveness of policy 
Phase Period Name Key characteristics Policy Targets Developments Realisation 
targets 
Explaining factors Effectiveness 
of policy 
1 1990-
1995 
Voluntary 
agreements 
Voluntary agreements 
government and energy 
distribution sector 
- 3.2% electricity sales and 
- 0.7% gas sales  
by the year 2000 
- Market became 
more mature 
- Leading policy 
document published 
in 1995 
No - Lack of enforcement 
- Lack of urgency/interest 
- New policies introduced 
- Further liberalisation of 
market 
Limited 
2 1996-
2002 
Promotion of 
demand 
- Exemption from ecotax 
- Liberalisation of green 
consumer market 
- Introduction of green 
certificates system 
- 5% of energy 
consumption to come from 
renewable sources by 
2010 
- 10% by 2020 
- Increased consumer 
demand  
- Increased capacity 
- Growth in demand 
by small consumers 
- No additional 
capacity  
- Large imports 
Most likely 
difficult to meet 
Insufficient incentives for 
investors 
- High with respect 
to small 
consumers 
demand  
- Limited with 
respect to supply 
3 2003-
ongoing 
Promotion of 
supply 
Support for renewable 
electricity by feed-in-tariff 
(and ecotax exemption) 
- 5% of energy 
consumption to come from 
renewable sources by 
2010 
- 10% by 2020 
- Reduced investment risk 
- Improved cost-
effectiveness 
 Too early to 
assess 
 Too early to 
assess 
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5.1 Conclusions on past and current policies 
The following conclusions can be drawn: 
• Objectives and targets The objectives and targets of Dutch renewable energy policy 
were frequently ambiguous. For example, the role of imports, the contribution of 
domestic production or consumption, and the role of sanctions were rather vague and 
imprecise. As a result of this, stakeholders didn't expect the Dutch government to be 
seriously committed to pursuing targets.  
• Voluntary versus compulsory green energy consumption Since the mid-1990s, 
there has been ongoing debate over whether goals can best be met by means of a 
voluntary or a mandatory approach. Although many stakeholders advocated the latter, 
Dutch policies stimulating renewable energy have always been voluntary. 
• Local production versus imported renewable energy Another point of discussion 
was the role of imports in meeting targets. Although the government emphasised the 
importance of investments in local capacity, imports were always (implicitly) seen as 
an alternative option.  
• Dominance of the Ministry of Economic Affairs The Ministry has always played a 
very dominant role in renewable energy policy formulation and implementation. On 
more than one occasion, policy advice from others has been rejected, in particular, 
suggestions to simplify the policy instrument mix and to introduce consumer 
obligations.  
• Late intervention to rescue failing policies The growth of the renewable energy 
market in the Netherlands has been limited and targets have not been met. This did 
not, however, prompt a swift policy response to address this failure to meet key 
policy objectives. 
• Lack of participation of stakeholders Although over time more stakeholders 
became involved in the policy-making process, the Ministry of Economic Affairs has 
remained the dominant actor. All in all, the influence of stakeholders in renewable 
energy policy making has been small. 
• Barriers Different obstacles hampered the development of the renewable energy 
market in the Netherlands. For a long period the government focused on reducing 
investment costs and dismantling administrative barriers. Only recently was the lack 
of a stable investment climate identified as a potential barrier. 
5.2 Lessons learned 
This section addresses the general lessons which can be learned from the Dutch renewable 
energy policy-making process. 
 
1. Reduce market uncertainties and build confidence through stable policy. In general 
terms, the effectiveness of policies to stimulate renewable energy is best guaranteed if 
governments create confidence among stakeholders. Uncertainties need to be 
minimised and actors should feel secure about future developments in policy. This 
means that governments should adopt clear and stable policy objectives and 
instruments. Any uncertainty on goals, vision and future direction will reduce the 
effectiveness. Also, frequent shifts in policy have negative impacts, as they lead to 
discontinuation of policy development. The Dutch government also failed to reduce 
market uncertainty. A stable climate for a growing renewable energy market is yet to 
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be established. The lack of clear and consistent policy objectives, instruments and 
enforcement procedures have hindered substantial investments in new capacity over 
recent decades. In the past, the government has not always been seen as a reliable 
partner.  
 
2. Ensure stakeholder participation at an early stage. Policy making in the Netherlands 
has lacked serious stakeholder participation in the past. On the one hand, this speeds 
up the policy-making process; on the other, without a strong input from participants 
and actors likely to be affected by policy, policy makers run a higher risk of 
misjudging the impact of their policies. 
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